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Abstract
Between 1940 and 2000 there has been a substantial increase of educational attainment in the
United States. What caused this trend? We develop a model of human capital accumulation
that features a non-degenerate distribution of educational attainment in the population.
We use this framework to assess the quantitative contribution of technological progress and
changes in life expectancy in explaining the evolution of educational attainment. The model
implies an increase in average years of schooling of 24 percent which is the increase observed
in the data. We nd that technological variables and in particular skill-biased technical
change represent the most important factors in accounting for the increase in educational
attainment. The strong response of schooling to changes in income is informative about the
potential role of educational policy and the impact of other trends aecting lifetime income.
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11 Introduction
One remarkable feature of the twentieth century in the United States is the substantial
increase in educational attainment of the population. Figure 1 illustrates this point. In
1940, 61 percent of white males aged 25 to 29 had not completed high-school education,
31 percent had a high-school degree but did not enroll in or nish college, and 8 percent
completed a college degree.1 The picture is remarkably dierent in 2000 when only 8 percent
of the same population did not complete high-school, 62 percent completed high-school,
and 30 percent completed college. While our focus is on white males, Figure 1 shows that
these trends are broadly shared across genders and races. The question we address in this
paper is: What caused this substantial and systematic rise of educational attainment in the
United States? Understanding the evolution of educational attainment is relevant given the
importance of human capital on the growth experience of the United States as well as nearly
all other developed and developing countries.
There are several potential explanations for the trends in educational attainment. Our
objective is to assess the quantitative relevance of a subset of these, namely the changes
in the returns to schooling induced by technical change and life expectancy.2 This focus
is motivated by empirical evidence that has identied systematic changes in the returns to
education between 1940 and 2000 in the United States as well as by quantitative research
showing a substantial response of educational attainment to changes in educational policy.3
To illustrate the changes in the returns to schooling we use the IPUMS samples for the 1940
to 2000 U.S. Census to compute labor earnings of employed white males of a given cohort
1In what follows we refer to the detailed educational categories simply as less than high-school, high-
school, and college.
2We acknowledge that other potential explanations such as changes in the direct or indirect costs of school-
ing, changes in credit constraints, and changes in social norms can be important and deserve a quantitative
assessment. However, we abstract from these potential alternative explanations in this paper.
3See Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003) for empirical evidence and Keane and Wolpin (1997), Restuccia
and Urrutia (2004), and the references therein for quantitative analysis.
2across three educational groups: less than high-school, high-school, and college. Figure 2
shows the corresponding relative labor earnings between college and high-school and between
high-school and less than high-school.
Figure 2 deserves a few comments. First, there is a noticeable decrease in both measures
of relative earnings during the 1940s, followed by an upward trend until 2000. The decline
during the 1940s has been documented elsewhere. Acemoglu (2002, Figure 1) shows a similar
pattern for the college premium and Goldin and Katz (2008, Figure 8.1) show a decline in
the college graduate and high-school graduate premia that started as early as 1915 and
lasted until 1950. Kaboski (2009, Figure 1) reports that the Mincerian returns to schooling
exhibit the same pattern as our measure of relative earnings. In addition, other measures of
inequality show a [-shape over the course of the twentieth century. For instance, the share
of income received by the top 1 (5 and 10) percent of the income distribution was 16 (30
and 40) percent in 1919. It declined to 11 (23 and 33) percent in 1949 and increased to 15
(30 and 41) in 1998.4 Finally, Kopczuk, Saez and Song (2010, Figure 1) show that the Gini
coecient for earnings of workers, gathered from Social Security data since 1937, exhibits
a [-shape too. Second, Figure 2 shows relative contemporaneous earnings which provide
relevant information, but are only indirect measures of the returns to schooling. Economic
theory dictates that rational, forward-looking individuals base their decisions on measures of
lifetime rather than contemporaneous income.5 In particular, in the model we consider in this
paper, the decisions of individuals depend on ratios of lifetime earnings measured in present
value and compared across possible schooling choices. For such forward-looking individuals
year-to-year or decade-to-decade 
uctuations in relative contemporaneous earnings are not
necessarily indicative of 
uctuations in the returns to schooling |at least not of the same
magnitude. We use this feature to justify the absence of short-term 
uctuations in the
4See the Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition, series Be27-29.
5This is the case when individuals have access to perfect credit markets, an assumption we make in our
model.
3exogenous technological variables driving the returns to schooling in the baseline model.
Third, as emphasized in the literature most notably by Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998),
the earnings information contained in Figure 2 refers to both quantities and prices of skills.
As will be emphasized in our quantitative analysis, small variations in skill prices produce
large variations in earnings across schooling groups with the amplication being done by
human capital accumulation both in the form of quantity of schooling as well as quality.
We develop a model of human capital accumulation that builds upon Becker (1964) and
Ben-Porath (1967). The model features overlapping generations of individuals living for a
nite number of years. Individuals are heterogenous with respect to their life expectancy,
which is specic to the generation in which they are born and with respect to the (dis)utility
from schooling. This last assumption is common in both the macro literature, e.g. Bils and
Klenow (2000), as well as the empirical labor literature, e.g. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber
(1998).6 There are three levels of schooling that individuals can choose from and there is a
standard human capital production function that requires the inputs of time (schooling) and
goods. The discrete schooling choice is motivated by the fact that the distribution of people
across years of schooling is strongly concentrated around years of degree completion. This
feature allows the model with three levels of schooling to capture distribution statistics such
as those presented in Figure 1. At the aggregate level, the consumption good is produced with
a constant-returns-to-scale technology requiring the input of human capital from workers of
all generations and all levels of schooling. The human capital of workers with dierent levels
of schooling are imperfect substitutes in production, therefore there are three dierent wage
rates, one for each school level, clearing the labor markets. The exogenous variables are
life expectancy, which increases from one generation to the next, total factor productivity
(TFP), and skill-biased productivity parameters in the production function.
6An additional source of heterogeneity may be through \learning ability." Navarro (2007) nds, however,
that individual heterogeneity aects college attendance mostly through the preference channel.
4We implement a quantitative experiment to assess the importance of changes in TFP and
skill-biased productivity, as well as life expectancy, on the rise of educational attainment.
We use data on life expectancy to discipline its model counterpart. TFP and skill-biased
technical change are not directly observable. To discipline their paths we observe that
earnings data are the empirical counterparts of the product of human capital and wages per
unit of human capital, both being endogenous objects determined in an equilibrium of our
model. Thus, earnings data can be used to discipline the paths of the neutral and skill-biased
productivity variables in the model. More generally, we choose the paths of these variables
and other parameters so that the model's equilibrium wages and schooling choices match a
set of key statistics: educational attainment in 1940, the trend in relative earnings across
schooling levels from 1940 to 2000, and the average growth rate of gross domestic product
(GDP) per worker between 1940 and 2000. This quantitative strategy follows the approach
advocated by Kydland and Prescott (1996). In particular, we emphasize that the parameter
values are not chosen to t the data on educational attainment from 1940 to 2000, instead
they are chosen to mimic the trends in relative earnings which, as mentioned earlier, provide
some relevant information about the returns to schooling.
Our ndings can be summarized as follows. First, our baseline experiment shows that
changes in life expectancy, TFP, and skill-biased technical variables, generate a substantial
increase in educational attainment. Specically, the model implies a substantial increase in
college attainment while under-predicting the decrease in the less-than-high school group
and under-predicting the increase in the high-school group. In terms of the average years
of schooling attained by generations reaching 25-29 between 1940 and 2000, the model gen-
erates an increase of 24.3 percent, from 10.8 in 1940 to 13.4 in 2000, which is the same as
the corresponding statistics computed using U.S. data. Second, we conduct a set of counter-
factual experiments revealing that the most relevant driving variables generating the rise in
educational attainment are, in order of importance, the \college-biased" technical variable,
5the \high-school-biased" technical variable, and life expectancy. If the \college-biased" tech-
nology did not rise as in our baseline experiment, average years of schooling would increase by
14.2 percent instead of 24.3 percent in the baseline. Interestingly, if the \high-school-biased"
technology did not rise as in the baseline, average years of schooling would increase faster
than in the baseline (26.8 percent). The reason for this result is that the lack of productivity
growth at the high-school level implies large returns to college versus high-school, driving a
strong increase in college attainment. When life expectancy remains constant educational
attainment still increases by 22.8 percent between 1940 and 2000 versus 24.3 percent in the
baseline. Hence, changes in life expectancy only explain about 6 percent of the increase in
average years of schooling in the model. Overall, we nd that schooling responds strongly to
skill-biased technical change, a result driven by a large change in relative earnings and not
from an implausibly large elasticity of educational attainment. This response of schooling
is informative for educational policy and for the evaluation of related trends. For instance,
the eect on educational attainment of the gaps in lifetime earnings associated with racial
or gender dierences or of rising costs of education.
Our paper contributes to a literature on human capital, schooling and income inequality.7
It complements this literature by analyzing the trends in schooling in a model that remains
consistent with the general trends in wage inequality, while the existing literature's main
focus is on explaining rising wage inequality. As discussed earlier, certain patterns of wage
inequality are not as relevant for schooling decisions. To the best of our knowledge there
has been no systematic attempt to quantify and decompose the forces that lead to changes
in educational attainment since 1940. Prominent papers such as Heckman, Lochner, and
Taber (1998) and Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009) focus on the determinants of rising wage
inequality since the late 1960s or early 1970s rather than on educational attainment itself.
More importantly, these models are not suited for studying the longer upward trend in the
7For a review of the evidence on inequality, see Topel (1997) and Acemoglu (2002).
6evolution of educational attainment which can be traced back to at least 1940.8 In addition,
these papers do not explicitly decompose the forces explaining the trends in schooling. Lee
and Wolpin (2006) and Lee and Wolpin (2010) propose and estimate dynamic equilibrium
models of the labor market with schooling and occupational choices. The main focus in these
papers is on accounting for intersectoral mobility and the evolution of wages and employment
structure in the U.S. between 1968 and 2000. Although the models have also implications
for the evolution of schooling, there is no explicit decomposition of the causes of the changes
in schooling over time.9
Our work also contributes to a literature in macroeconomics assessing the role of technical
progress on a variety of trends.10 It also relates to the labor literature emphasizing the
connection between technology and education such as Goldin and Katz (2008) and the lit-
erature on wage inequality emphasizing skill-biased technical change.11 We recognize that
changes in the returns to education may not be the only explanation for rising education
during this period. For instance Glomm and Ravikumar (2001) emphasize the rise in public-
sector provision of education. We also recognize that educational attainment was rising well
before 1940 and that changes in the returns to education may not be a contributing factor
during the earlier period. Our focus on the period between 1940 and 2000 follows from data
restrictions and the emphasis in the labor literature on rising returns to education as the
likely cause of rising wage inequality. In the broader historical context, other factors may be
8Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998, page 33) report that their model produces large jumps in college
enrollment, inconsistent with the path observed in Figure 1. They discuss how their model could be modied
to alleviate this concern. Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009, Section 4.4) report that their model does not capture
the behavior of college enrollment in the short run, and that the level of hours supplied by college-educated
individuals is signicantly below the counterpart in the U.S. data.
9He and Liu (2008) propose a model of skill accumulation to study rising wage inequality but do not ex-
plicitly model schooling, rather the accumulation of the stock of skills (human capital). He (2011) considers
a model of discrete schooling choices with a focus on separating the contribution of demographic and tech-
nological factors in understanding the patterns of wage inequality. Moreover, the model in He (2011), while
consistent with the evolution of wage inequality, produces only a small increase in educational attainment
compared to the data.
10See Greenwood and Seshadri (2005) and the references therein.
11See for instance Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) and Katz and Author (1999).
7more important such as the development of educational institutions and declines in schooling
costs.12
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the model. In
Section 3 we calibrate the model and conduct the main quantitative experiments. Section 4
discusses our main results in the context of various alternative specications and experiments.
We conclude in Section 5.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Time is discrete. We use t to refer to calendar time. The economy is inhabited by overlapping
generations of individuals living for a nite number of periods. The size of each generation
is normalized to one. We use  to refer to a generation, i.e. generation  is composed of
individuals of age 1 at date t = . Individuals of the same generation are heterogeneous with
respect to the intensity of their (dis)taste for schooling which is represented by a 2 R; and is
distributed according to the time-invariant cumulative distribution function A.13 Individuals
of dierent generations dier by their life expectancy, T(). Dene A = Rf0;1;:::;1g as
12See for instance Goldin and Katz (2008) and Kaboski (2004).
13We abstract from ability to learn and earn across individuals as another potential source of dierences
in educational attainment. We recognize however that ability may be important for schooling choices. There
are three main motivations for our abstraction. First, there is no complete agreement in the literature as to
how ability is actually changing over time for the dierent schooling groups. Depending upon assumptions,
the mapping of ability and schooling may imply that, over time, average ability decreases, stays constant,
or even increases. Second, empirical estimates from structural models that have included both preference
variation and ability variation seem to nd that ability selection is less relevant in determining schooling
choices than the preference variation (see for instance Navarro (2007)). Third, for the type of experiment
we perform in the paper, namely that we infer growth in technology to reproduce paths of earnings, changes
in average ability would require dierent growth in technology variables, mitigating the potential dierent
impact on schooling over time.
8the set of individual types, i.e., pairs composed of a schooling taste parameter, a 2 R, and a
generation index  2 f0;1;:::;1g: We assume that a and T() are observed by individuals
before any decisions are made. We also assume that there is no uncertainty and that credit
markets are perfect. We use r to denote the gross rate of interest which is exogenously given
and equals the inverse of the subjective discount factor.
An individual can accumulate human capital through schooling before entering the labor
market. Let h(s;e) denote his human capital once he starts working. It is a function of s,
the number of years he spent in school, and e which represents services aecting the quality
of education purchased by the individual while in school. Both s and e are choice variables.
There are three levels of schooling labeled 1, 2 and 3. To complete level i an individual has
to spend si 2 fs1;s2;s3g periods in school and, therefore, cannot work before reaching age
si + 1. We assume s1 < s2 < s3. Thus, level 1 is the model's counterpart to the less than
high-school category discussed in Section 1. Similarly, level 2 corresponds to the high-school
category and level 3 to college.
There is a single consumption good produced with a constant-returns-to-scale technology
using three inputs: the human capital of workers who completed s1 years of schooling, the
human capital of workers who completed s2 years of schooling and, nally, the human capital
workers who completed s3 years. The three types of human capital are not perfect substitutes
in production, thus the wage rate per unit of human capital is specic to each schooling level:
wt(s) at date t.
92.2 Individuals
Preferences are dened over consumption sequences and time spent in school. They are




t  ln(ct)   as;
where  2 (0;1) is the subjective discount factor, ct is consumption during period t and
s represents years of schooling. Note that a can be positive or negative so that schooling








where  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
The optimization problem of an individual of type (a;) is as follows:
max
s2fs1;s2;s3g
fV(s)   asg; (1)



































where  2 (0;1). Note that lifetime income, in the right-hand side of the intertemporal
budget constraint (3), stipulates that labor income is earned from age s + 1 onward. Thus,
this optimization program summarizes the various costs associated with acquiring education:
the utility cost, the time cost, and the resource cost. We assume that s and e are chosen
once and for all at the beginning of an individual's life. Therefore e is the present value of
educational expenditures.
Dene I(s), the lifetime income net of the cost of educational expenditures for an individual
of generation  conditional on schooling level s:
I(s) = max
e fh(s;e)W(s)   eg: (6)
Given our assumption that the rate of interest and the subjective rate of discount are the
same, i.e., r = 1, the optimal consumption sequence is constant throughout an individual's










We can now turn to the characterization of an individual's optimal choice of schooling. Note
that the value functions V(s)   as are decreasing in a with slopes that are increasing (in
absolute value) in s. Figure 3 displays these functions and describes the schooling choice
of individuals from generation . Specically, an individual of type (a;) chooses schooling
level i over j (i > j) whenever his utility cost of schooling is low enough, that is whenever
a < aij;; where aij; is the threshold value of a for which the individual is indierent between
11i and j:
V(si)   aij;si = V(sj)   aij;sj:













The innite support for a ensures that each pair of value functions has a single intersection
and that there are always non-empty sets of individuals choosing the rst and third level of
schooling. It is possible, however, that no individual nds it optimal to choose the second
level. This situation is illustrated in panel b of Figure 3. The schooling decision of an
individual of type (a;) is therefore described as
s(a;) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
s3 if a  minfa32;;a31;g
s1 if a  maxfa21;;a31;g
s2 otherwise.
(8)
In summary, the optimal choices of an individual of type (a;) are a schooling choice s(a;),
an educational expenditure e(a;) and a consumption sequence fct(a;)g
+T() 1
t= solving the
optimization problem (1){(5). The specic form of the schooling choice is described in (8),
the educational expenditure is the maximizer of (6), i.e.,
e(a;) = s(a;)((1   )W(s(a;)))
1= ; (9)
implying that the human capital of the individual is
h(s(a;);e(a;)) = s(a;)((1   )W(s(a;)))
(1 )= ; (10)





At each date, there is a single good produced with a constant returns to scale technology.
We specify the production technology along lines suggested by Goldin and Katz (2008, page
294). That is we assume a CES production function between college human capital and a














where Hi;t is the demand, at date t, for human capital supplied by individuals who completed
the ith level of schooling. The parameters  and  govern the elasticity of substitution
between inputs. Specically, the elasticity of substitution between H1;t and H2;t is 1=(1 )






1=(1 ). The parameters zit (i = 1;2;3) are school-specic, exogenous productivity terms.
We label the term zt as TFP, but we note that if  is dierent than  changes in zt are not
neutral because they aect the marginal products of the Hi;t's dierently. Since our focus is
on long-run trends we assume constant rates of growth. Thus,
zi;t = zi;0  g
t
i for i = 1;2;3 and zt = z0  g
t;
where the gi's are the (gross) rates of growth of the zi;ts, and the zi;0s are initial conditions.











F(H1t;H2t;H3t)   wt(si) for i = 1;2;3: (11)
2.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium of the labor market involves equating the supply and demand for human
capital of individuals with schooling level i. To specify these market-clearing conditions note
that the youngest individual employed at t with s years of schooling is of age 1 at date t s,
hence, this individual is from generation t   s. Thus, with a utility cost of schooling of a,
human capital of this individual at date t is h(s;e(a;t s)). The oldest worker at date t is of
age 1 at a date (t) such that  + T()   1 = t: Hence, the total human capital supplied





where I is the indicator function. In this expression the discrete summation aggregates over
generations working at date t while the integral aggregates over the taste for schooling within





h(si;e(a;))Ifs(a;) = sigA(da) for i = 1;2;3: (12)
Denition 1 Given r, a competitive equilibrium of the labor market is composed of (i) allo-
14cations for individuals of each type: ffct(a;)g
+T() 1
t= ;e(a;);s(a;)g(a;)2A, and allocations
for rms: fH1t;H2t;H3tg1
t=0; (ii) prices: fwt(s1);wt(s2);wt(s3)g1
t=0; such that
1. Optimization:
{ The allocations ffct(a;)g
+T() 1
t= ;e(a;);s(a;)g(a;)2A solve the optimization prob-
lem of each individual (a;) 2 A given prices;
{ The allocation fH1t;H2t;H3tg1
t=0 solves the rm's optimization problem given prices;
2. Market clearing:
{ Equations (12) hold at each t.
It is useful to dene a notation for the educational attainment of generation : Let then pi;
be the proportion of members of generation  having completed schooling level i:
pi; =
Z
Ifs(a;) = sigA(da): (13)
pi; is the model counterpart of the educational attainment statistics of Figure 1.14
2.5 Discussion
Equations (7) and (8) establish that the schooling decision of an individual depends upon the
semi-elasticity of net lifetime income across schooling levels. For instance, an increase in the
14Note that for a given level of schooling the education expenditures are constant across members of the
same generation regardless of their taste parameter a {see Equation (9). This implies that the human capital
of individuals of the same generation with the same level of schooling is also constant across individuals













for i = 1;2;3:
15lifetime income from college relative to high-school, I(s3)=I(s2), raises the threshold utility
cost of entering college, a32; and, therefore, increases college attainment. The magnitude of
the increase depends upon the magnitude of the change in the threshold as well as the shape of
the distribution of utility-schooling costs, A, as can be seen from Figure 3. More specically,
the proportion of individuals from generation  completing college can be written, using
Equation (13), as p3; = A(a32;) which implies that the evolution of college attainment
















Equations (14) and (15) deserve a few comments. First, the distribution of schooling-utility
cost, A, is relevant for the quantitative impact of changes in income on educational attain-
ment. Given this, one concern may be our assumption that A is a Normal distribution. We
have experimented with more 
exible distributions and found that our quantitative results
are essentially unchanged when the parameters of the distribution are calibrated as we do
in Section 3.15 Second, changes in the critical values a32; and a21; are driven by changes in
life expectancy and relative lifetime incomes. The relative lifetime income I(si)=I(sj) for





















15We performed these experiments using the Beta distribution for two reasons. First, because the Beta
has two parameters, allowing us to maintain our calibration strategy. Second, because the density of the
Beta distribution can accommodate many dierent shapes such as uniform, bell-shaped or [-shaped and
not necessarily symmetric. Our main nding is that when we let A be a Beta distribution our calibration
procedure implies parameters such that its density is numerically very close to the normal density we calibrate
in Section 3, see Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2010).
16This expression diers from one generation to the next, implying dierent schooling choices,
because life expectancy and the future path of wages per unit of human capital dier across
generations. Skill-biased technical change has a rst order eect on educational attainment
because it can change disproportionately the wages wt(si) and wt(sj). However, our model
rules out the possibility that skill-neutral technical change matters. To see this, imagine
that wt(si) and wt(sj) are both multiplied by the same number for each t, then the ra-
tio I(si)=I(sj) remains constant and educational attainment is unchanged. Whether the
wt(s)'s, which are endogenous, actually behave in such a way as to generate changes in ed-




The rst stage of our calibration strategy is to assign values to some parameters using a-
priori information. We let a period represent one year. We set the gross interest rate to
r = 1:04 and the subjective discount factor to  = 1=r: For the number of years required by
each level of education we use s1 = 9, s2 = 13 and s3 = 16.16 Following Bils and Klenow
(2000), we choose  = 0:9.
For T(), the life expectancy of generation , we add Hazan (2009) measure of years spent
on the market by cohort to Goldin and Katz (2008)'s gures for years of schooling achieved
16Using the IPUMS samples for the 1940 and 2000 U.S. Census, we nd that the average number of years
spent in school was 8.9 and 12.9 for individuals with less than high school and with high school completion.
Since to solve our model we need to compute discrete sums of the form given in Equation (4), we rounded
these gures to s1 = 9 and s2 = 13. We assume s3 = 16 for all years.
17by cohort. We nd T(1900) = 47 and T(2000) = 64 and assume a linear time trend to
determine the life expectancy of other generations.
Our specication of the production function followed Goldin and Katz (2008). These authors
provide estimates to the required elasticity parameters. They consider three values for the
elasticity of substitution between the rst and second level of schooling: 2, 3 and 5. We use
the intermediate value 3 so that  = 1   1=3. They also consider 3 values for the elasticity
of substitution between the third level of education and the aggregate of the rst two levels:
1.4, 1.64 and 1.84. We use the intermediate value 1.64 so that  = 1   1=1:64.
The list of remaining parameters is
 = (;;z1;0;z2;0;z3;0;g;g1;g2;g3);
which consists of the distribution parameters for the utility cost of schooling, and initial
levels and growth rates for the productivity variables. We normalized the initial level of z
to 1:
z0 = 1:
To assign a value to  we build a measure of the distance between statistics generated by the
model and their empirical counterparts in the U.S. data. We target the following statistics:
1. The educational attainment of the 25-29 years old in the 1940 Census, that is 61 percent
of individuals attaining less than high-school and 31.2 percent of individuals attaining
high-school education. The model counterpart to these statistics is educational attain-
ment of the 1921 generation which corresponds to individuals reaching age 25 in 1940
in the U.S. data.
2. The time path of relative earnings from 1940 to 2000, displayed in Figure 2.
183. The growth rate of GDP per worker from 1940 to 2000 which was on average 2 percent.
This target ensures that the growth rate of productivity does not imply unreasonable
levels of economic growth.
Even though the parameter values are chosen simultaneously to match the data targets, each
parameter has a rst-order eect on some target. The levels of the technology parameters
and their growth rates are important in matching the time path of relative earnings across
schooling groups. The growth rate of TFP is important in matching growth in average labor
productivity, but because TFP is not neutral it also matters for matching relative earnings.
The distribution parameters,  and , are critical in matching the distribution of educational
attainment in 1940.
Formally, the calibration strategy can be described as follows. Given a value for  we compute




is the ratio of earnings between members of group i and j at the age of 25 at date t in
the model. The empirical counterpart of ^ E32;t() is the relative earnings between college
and high-school, for white males between the age of 25 and 29, denoted by E32;t. Similarly,
^ E21;t() is the model counterpart of E21;t, the relative earnings between high-school and less
than high-school. Second, we dene
M() =
2






7 7 7 7
5
:














where T  f1940;1950;:::;2000g: The rst part of the objective function is the distance
between the relative contemporaneous earnings implied by the model and their empirical
counterpart at Census dates between 1940 and 2000. The second part of the function is
the distance between the model and the rest of the targets in our procedure: educational
attainment in 1940 and the growth rate of the economy between 1940 and 2000.
At this stage it is important to describe the computational experiment leading to the deter-
mination of a particular equilibrium trajectory of our model. First, observe that the decisions
of generation  depend on the path of wages from date  onward, as summarized in W(s)
in Equation (4). These wages depend on the stocks of aggregate human capital at each date
which, in turn, depend on the decisions of generations prior to  {see Equations (11) and
(12). To circumvent this we make two assumptions. First, we assume that the economy is
in a steady state until date 0 (corresponding to 1860 in the data). That is, the rst step
in the determination of an equilibrium trajectory is to determine educational attainment
and human capital when the exogenous parameters (productivity and life expectancy) are
constant at their initial values. Under this assumption we can solve for wages at any date t
by assuming that the human capital, at t, of individuals born prior to date 1 is the steady
state human capital. Second, we assume that exogenous variables start growing from date
50 (corresponding to 1910 in the data). The motivation for this second assumption is to
avoid a discontinuity in the schooling and human capital choices between the generations
up to to date 0 and the date 1 and subsequent generations. Thus exogenous variables are
constant from t =  1 to t = 50 and then start growing at the rate prescribed by the gi's
for productivity and as prescribed by the linear trend of T for life expectancy.
20The calibrated parameters are presented in Table 1. The model is able to match well its
calibration targets. The growth rate of output per worker is 2 percent per year. Also, the
model implies a smooth path of relative earnings that captures the trend observed in the data
as illustrated in Figure 4. In the initial steady state, 2 percent of a generation completed
college education, 11 percent completed high school, and 87 percent attained less than high
school.
3.2 Baseline Experiment
The main quantitative implications of the model are the time paths for the distribution
of educational attainment for the three categories considered: less than high-school, high-
school, and college. Figure 5 reports these implications of the model. The model implies
a substantial increase in college attainment, but it under-predicts the decrease in the less
than high-school group and the increase in the high-school group. The fraction of 25 to 29
year-olds with college education increases in the model by 33 percentage points from 1940
to 2000, while in the data the increase is 20 percentage points. For high-school, the model
implies an increase from 31 to 39 percent between 1940 and 2000 whereas, in the data, the
increase is from 31 to 61.5 percent.
To summarize our quantitative ndings, we calculate average years of schooling of a given




where si are the three constant schooling categories and pi is the fraction of the relevant
population that attains each schooling level. In the U.S. data average years of schooling
increased by 24.3 percent, from 10.8 in 1940 to 13.4 in 2000. The model reproduces the
21average years of schooling in 1940 as a calibration target and implies an average years of
schooling in 2000 of 13.4. Thus, by this measure, the model accounts for 100 percent of the
increase in average years of schooling between 1940 and 2000.
The path of relative earnings in the data is fairly irregular compared to the calibrated path
(see again Figure 4). This may raise concerns as to the sensitivity of our results to the choice
of constant growth rates for the productivity variables. We note, however, that education
decisions are forward looking and in particular, in our model, individuals consider the lifetime
earnings associated with each schooling choice. That relative earnings fall or increase sharply
in a particular decade in the data is only relevant to the extent that it aects relative lifetime
earnings calculations for some cohorts. The constant-growth-rate assumption is a useful and
parsimonious way to capture the relevant patterns for relative earnings in the data. In fact,
we show in section 4.2 that alternative assumptions about the variability of skill prices leaves
our results almost unaltered. The most relevant deviation from our quantitative results is
on the extent of foresight of individuals for the future path of skill prices. However, we
show in section 4.1 that even the most conservative form of expectations {where wages are
assumed to be constant throughout the lifetime{ technical progress still accounts for almost
40 percent of the observed increase in educational attainment.
3.3 Decomposing the Forces
We quantitatively decompose the contributions of exogenous variables to the changes in
educational attainment. We proceed by running a set of counterfactual experiments. The
rst three experiments are designed to assess the eect of productivity biased toward the
each education group, zit. We compute an equilibrium trajectory of the model under the
calibration derived in Section 3.1 with one dierence: we impose that zit remains constant
22at its initial level while all other exogenous variables grow as in the baseline exercise That
is we assume gi = 1 for each i in these experiments. In the fourth experiment, zt is xed at
the initial level, i.e., g = 1. In the fth experiment we x life expectancy at its initial level
while all productivity terms grow as in the baseline. In the last experiment, z1t, z2t and z3t
are held constant at their initial level and only life expectancy and neutral productivity zt
increase.
Eect of z1 This experiment assumes g1 = 1. We decompose the predictions of the
model into two steps. First, the level of educational attainment measured by average years
of schooling is lower in 1940 in this experiment than in the baseline: 10.5 (v. 10.8 in
the baseline). This lower attainment results from a larger fraction of individuals having
completed less than high school education in 1940: 68 percent (v. 61 in the baseline), and
a lower fraction of people having completed high school: 24 percent (v. 31 in the baseline).
Second, the evolution of educational attainment (from a lower initial value) is quite similar
to the baseline. Average years of schooling increase by 23.8 percent between 1940 and 2000
(v. 24.3 in the baseline). The small role of growth in z1 on educational attainment is due to
the fact that g1 = 0:996 in the baseline calibration is fairly close to 1 as in this counterfactual
experiment. The growth rate of the economy is 2.05 percent per year.
Eect of z2 This experiment assumes g2 = 1. The level of educational attainment in
1940 in this experiment is lower than in the baseline and in the previous experiment: 10.2
(v. 10.8 in the baseline). This is due to a large number of individuals having completed
less than high school: 76 percent (v. 61 in the baseline), and a low number of individuals
having completed high school: 16 percent (v. 31 in the baseline). Through time, however,
educational attainment increases faster in this experiment than in the baseline: average years
of schooling increase by 26.8 percent between 1940 and 2000 (v. 24.3 in the baseline). This
23increase is driven mostly by the fact that, holding z2;t constant produces an increase in the
college to high-school earnings ratio while reducing the change in the high-school to less than
high-school earnings ratio. Specically, in the baseline experiment the college to high-school
earnings ratio increased by 4.46 percent between 1940 and 2000 while in this experiment
it increases by 5.45 percent. The high-school to less than high-school earnings ratio, which
increased by 5.35 percent in the baseline increases by only 2.40 percent in this experiment.
As a result college attainment increases from 8 to 50 percent while the fraction of individuals
with less than high school falls from 76 to 38 percent (v. 61 to 20 percent in the baseline),
driving the strong increase in average years of schooling. The growth rate of the economy is
1.63 percent per year (v. 2 in the baseline). This lower growth rate relative to the baseline
despite a stronger increase in years of schooling is the result of lower productivity growth.
Eect of z3 This experiment assumes g3 = 1. The level of educational attainment mea-
sured by average years of schooling in 1940 in this experiment is similar to that of the rst
experiment: 10.5 (v. 10.8 in the baseline). The fraction of individuals having completed
college education is lower than in the baseline: 2 percent (v. 8 in the baseline), while the
proportions of those with less than high school and high school are slightly higher than in
the baseline: 65 and 33 percent (v. 61 and 31 in the baseline). Through time, the college
to high-school earnings ratio decreases by 2.84 percent between 1940 and 2000, implying a
stagnation of college attainment: 2 percent in 2000 as in 1940. The increase in the high-
school to less than high-school earnings ratio is 7.05 percent and, as a consequence, average
years of schooling increases thanks to high-school enrollment. But the increase in average
years of schooling between 1940 and 2000 is noticeably smaller than in the baseline: 14.2
percent (v. 24.3 percent in the baseline).
24Eect of z This experiment assumes g = 1. There is little eect on educational attainment.
In 1940 average years of schooling is 10.7 (v. 10.8 in the baseline). The dierence is due to the
smaller high-school and college attainment: 30 and 7 percent (v. 31 and 8 in the baseline).
The evolution of educational attainment is quite similar to the baseline with average years of
schooling increasing by 23.8 percent between 1940 and 2000 (v. 24.3 percent in the baseline).
Eect of T When T remains constant at its initial level, educational attainment in 1940
is higher than in the baseline: 11.9 years (v. 10.8). This dierence with the baseline is
the result of stronger growth in relative earnings through equilibrium eects. Unlike in the
baseline model where increases in productivity are mitigated in equilibrium by increases in
population size due to increasing life expectancy, in this experiment there is no oset of the
productivity eects. Through time, however, the eect of T is moderate. Between 1940
and 2000 average years of schooling increases by 22.8 percent (v. 24.3 in the baseline). The
constant population implies that the economy grows faster in this experiment: 2.52 percent
(v. 2 in the baseline).
Eect of z1, z2 and z3 The previous experiments suggest that T and z have a small con-
tribution to the change in educational attainment over time. To assess the joint contribution
of the productivity parameters biased toward various educational groups, that is z1, z2 and
z3, we conduct an experiment where these three are set constant to their initial levels while
T and z behave as in the baseline model. First, we observe that the level of educational
attainment in 1940 is quite lower than in the baseline: 9.6 years instead of 10.8. Second,
the increase in educational attainment through time is almost null since average years of
schooling increase by 0.2 percent over the 1940{2000 period (v. 24.3 in the baseline). This is
the result of the decrease in relative earnings implied by the absence of productivity growth
combined with the increase in human capital due to growing life expectancy.
254 Discussion
4.1 Expectations
In our model, lifetime income is a critical determinant of educational attainment and human
capital accumulation as illustrated in equations (7)-(8). A key underlining assumption in
our quantitative assessment of skill-biased technical change in the baseline model is that
individuals have perfect foresight about the evolution of wages and hence the lifetime income
implied in each schooling level. To the extent that part of the observed changes in income
are dicult to forecast, a reasonable question to ask is whether our quantitative assessment
hinges critically on the perfect-foresight assumption. While we view the baseline model with
perfect foresight as an appropriate benchmark to quantitatively assess the implications of
changes in technology and life expectancy on schooling, our aim in this section is to provide
reasonable alternatives that illustrate the quantitative importance of the perfect-foresight
assumption. There are in principle many alternatives to perfect foresight but some of these
have limited applicability in the particular context of our model. In our model, individuals
make once-and-for-all educational decisions at the beginning of their life taking into account
the future evolution of wages and their impact in lifetime income in each of the educational
choices. Hence, in this context, we investigate alternative assumptions about the perceived
path of wages that individuals use in comparing educational choices.
Before we describe what we do, it is important to note that individuals in our model need
information on wages while in the data we have data on earnings which combines wages and
human capital. The solution to our baseline model has predictions for earnings and human
capital from which we extract wage information. We use these paths for wages to construct
alternative assumptions about lifetime income for individuals. More concretely, we assume
26that individuals make educational decisions from an estimate of lifetime income that is based
on past wages, we denote this estimate of lifetime income ^ I(s) given by:















where gs;;n is a constant annual gross growth rate of wages in education level s for an
individual of generation  that is based on wages in the last n periods. Current wages across
educational categories are observed before educational decisions are made for each generation
. Note that this estimate of lifetime income diers from the lifetime income assumed in
the baseline model with perfect foresight I(s) implied by equations (4)-(6). The estimated
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1 for n = 0
We refer to these expectations as \history-based." Individuals make educational decisions as
before, dictated by equations (7)-(8) where the ratio of lifetime income I(si)=I(sj) in those
equations is replaced now by the estimate ^ I(si)=^ I(sj) in equation (16). In what follows, we
generically refer to these ratios of lifetime income across educational categories as returns to
education.
We compute educational attainment for each generation under dierent specications of n
for the history-based expectations but otherwise assuming the same parameter values as in
the baseline model. We compare the implications on educational attainment against the
baseline model. We start by computing the case where individuals use a long historical time
series of wages to predict future income. We assume n = 100. Table 3 reports the results
for average years of schooling in 1940 and 2000 as well as the rate of change during the
27period. We also report the implied returns to education in each case. We emphasize that
while average years of schooling increase at a slower pace in this experiment relative to the
baseline model, there is still a substantial increase in schooling, an increase of 20.6 percent
between 1940 and 2000 versus the 24.3 percent increase in the baseline model. We note that
in this experiment average years of schooling in 1940 is 9.6 years compared to 10.8 years in
the baseline model and data. The reason for this discrepancy is the fact that the model is
not re-calibrated to the targets in the baseline model and, as a result, the expected increase
in lifetime income is systematically lower than the baseline increase in lifetime income (on
average expected increases in lifetime income in this experiment are 9 percent lower than in
the baseline).17
For completeness, we also conduct an experiment where individuals assume that wages re-
main constant throughout their lifetime, that is we compute the case for n = 0. Table 3
reports the results for this case. Not surprisingly, individuals underestimate the returns to
schooling both for college and high-school relative to the baseline and this has implications
for the levels of educational attainment. In this experiment, average years of schooling in-
crease by 9.3 percent between 1940 and 2000 (versus 24.3 percent in the baseline). Even
though individuals expect wages to remain constant throughout their lifetime, each new co-
hort observes current relative wages when making educational decisions which aect their
choices. This eect alone explains 38 percent (9:3=24:3) of the increase in average years of
schooling between 1940 and 2000.18
17To the extent that the level of educational attainment is useful in pinning down the elasticity of schooling
on income changes, as discussed previously, we nd it of interest to also evaluate the implications of the same
experiment but with a recalibration of the distribution of schooling costs ( and ) to match the average
years of schooling in 1940 in the data. We note that the ratio of lifetime income in the model is independent
of  and  and as a result, the implications on lifetime income in this experiment are the same as in the
model without the recalibration. We nd in this case that the experiment generates an increase in average
years of schooling of 23.3 percent which is larger than the one without recalibration and closer to the baseline
experiment.
18When adjusting the parameters of the cost-of-schooling distribution to match the average years of school-
ing in 1940, this experiment produces an increase in average years of schooling of 12.6 percent compared to
the 9.3 percent without recalibrating and 24.3 percent in the baseline.
28We conclude that while the extent of foresight of future wages is important for the contribu-
tion of skill-biased technical progress to the increase in educational attainment, in the most
conservative scenario where individuals assume constant wages throughout, the impact of
skill-biased technology still implies a substantial increase in educational attainment, almost
40 percent of the observed increase in average years of schooling.
4.2 Time-Series Variability in Relative Earnings
Another potentially relevant feature in the time series of relative earnings across schooling
groups is the decade-to-decade variation (see again Figure 4). While in the baseline model
we captured the long-run path for these series, a relevant question is whether 
uctuations in
relative earnings around these trends are important for the overall contribution of skill-biased
technological progress to the increase in schooling. To the extent that educational decisions
by individuals are made based on measures of lifetime income, we expect that variability
around the trend doesn't have a rst-order impact on the overall contribution of skill biased
technical progress to the increase in schooling. Nevertheless, the objective in this section is
to assess the quantitative importance of the 
uctuations in relative earnings for the results.
As discussed earlier, there is not a simple decomposition of relative earnings in the data
between wages and human capital. Broadly speaking, to circumvent this issue, we feed in
a series of wages in the model such that the implied optimal human capital decisions of
individuals generate the relative earnings we observe in the data. We emphasize two main
ndings. First, we nd, perhaps no so surprisingly, that we need small deviations in trend
growth for wages to capture the 
uctuations in relative earnings seen in the data. Second,
educational attainment implied by the model is fairly close to the baseline. For instance, in
1940, 63 percent of individuals attained less than high-school (v. 61 percent in the baseline)
29and 28 percent attained high-school (v. 31 percent in the baseline), implying 10.75 years of
schooling in 1940 (v. 10.8 in the baseline). The model also implies an increase in average
years of schooling between 1940 and 2000 of 25.5 percent (v. 24.3 percent in the baseline).
We conduct the same experiments related to the perfect-foresight assumption as in the
previous section to assess the impact of 
uctuations in relative earnings. In the long history
case where n = 100, that is when individuals use a long time series of data to evaluate
the growth rate of wages, educational attainment measured by average years of schooling
increases by 20.5 percent (v. 20.6 percent with trend wages and 24.3 percent in the baseline).
When individuals expect no changes in relative earnings, the case where n = 0, average years
of schooling increases by 9 percent (v. 9.3 percent with trend wages).
We conclude that while decade-by-decade 
uctuations in relative earnings may be potentially
important for educational decisions, we nd that these 
uctuations are not quantitatively
important in reducing the overall contribution of skill-biased technical change on schooling,
in the perfect foresight case as well as the more conservative type of expected income.
4.3 Other Items
The model delivers an elasticity of educational attainment to changes in lifetime income
which is driven mostly by skill biased technical change. As argued previously, a critical
aspect of the discipline of this elasticity in our calibration is from the utility cost of schooling
to match the distribution of educational attainment. We discuss the reasonableness of the
implied elasticity by looking at closely related empirical and model-based evidence. We also
connect the implications of the implied elasticity for educational policy and other trends that
may aect relative incomes. Next, we discuss the relevance for our results of considering
human capital accumulation on the job.
30The Elasticity of Educational Attainment There is a large empirical literature as-
sessing the impact of educational policy on schooling. The typical focus is on assessing the
response of college attainment to changes in subsidies or other factors that alter lifetime
incomes such as Dynarski (2002, 2003), van der Klaauw (2002), and Keane and Wolpin
(1997). While there is no complete agreement on the exact magnitude of these elasticities,
the evidence suggests that they are large and we use this evidence to provide a benchmark
against which to assess the magnitude implied by our quantitative results. For instance,
Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimate a life-cycle model of schooling and career choices. Their
structural estimates imply that subsidizing college costs by about 50 percent increases col-
lege completion from 28.3 to 36.7 percent. To construct an elasticity, we calculate that the
subsidy represents about 1 percent of lifetime income.19 This implies an elasticity of college
completion of ln(36:7=28:3)=ln(1:01) = 26: We calculate that in our model a subsidy of the
same size, that is 1 percent of the lifetime income from college for the 1981 generation (the
generation whose educational attainment is measured in 2000) yields an increase in college
attainment from 40.8 to 45.5, that is an elasticity of ln(45:5=40:8)=log(1:01) = 11: Dynarski
(2003) studies an exogenous change in education policy {namely the elimination of the Social
Security Student Benet program in the United States in 1981{ that aected some students
but not others. Dynarski found that $1,000 (dollars of year 2000) in college subsidy generates
an increase in college enrollment of 3.6 percentage points. We can also relate to this nding
by performing the same policy experiment. To obtain an increase in college enrollment of
3.6 percentage points in 2000 in the model, a subsidy to college equivalent to 0.8 percent
of lifetime income is needed which, we argue, is a larger number than $1,000. We conclude
from these experiments that the strong eect of skill-biased technical change on educational
attainment in the baseline model comes from strong changes in relative earnings and not
from an implausibly large elasticity of educational attainment. The quantitative magnitude
19Keane and Wolpin (1997)'s subsidy is $2,000 per year for four years. The present value of a $35,000
annual income for 40 years, discounted at 4% is about $730,000. So, we found 2000  4=730;000 = 0:01:
31of the response of schooling to changes in relative lifetime income is relevant for educational
policy and for the impact evaluation of other related trends. For example, it is often viewed
that the racial gap in schooling is related primarily to under investments in education in the
early part of life. Our results suggest that another important factor is the gap in lifetime
earnings associated with racial dierences. Similarly, there have been recent discussions on
the rising costs of college in explaining a recent slowdown in college enrolment. In the con-
text of our model, rising costs of education can have implications for schooling to the extent
that they aect the relative lifetime earnings (net of educational costs).
Experience Our model abstracts from human capital accumulated on the job. The data
suggest that there are considerable returns to experience. The age prole of earnings, for
example, are increasing in the data while our baseline model implies that they are decreasing.
Returns to experience may aect educational decisions. First, if they increase with education
{as has been documented is the case in the data{ then this provides an additional return
to schooling, reinforcing the eects of skill-biased technical change. Second, substantial
returns to experience implies that, other things equal, individuals would have an incentive
to enter the labor market sooner. Because of these opposing eects, it is a quantitative
question whether on-the-job human capital accumulation aects the evolution of educational
attainment over time. We have experimented adding on-the-job human capital accumulation
to the model and found that under a reasonable calibration of the returns to experience, our
baseline results remain after adding experience.20
20For more details on these experiments see Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2010).
325 Conclusion
We developed a model of human capital accumulation to address the role of changes in the
returns to education on the rise of educational attainment in the United States between 1940
and 2000. The model features discrete schooling choices and individual heterogeneity so that
people sort themselves into the dierent schooling groups. In the model, skill-biased technical
change increases the returns to schooling thereby creating an incentive for more people to
attain higher levels of schooling. We nd that changes in the returns to education generate
a substantial increase in educational attainment and that this quantitative importance is
robust to relevant variations in the model. We also found that the substantial changes in
life expectancy in the data turn out to explain a small portion of the change in educational
attainment in the model.
There are several issues that would be worth exploring further. First, we have not addressed
the factors that may contribute to the slowdown in college attainment since the late 70s.
Assessing the contribution of rising college costs together with tighter borrowing constraints
may be important. Second, it would be interesting to assess the role of changes in the returns
to education on educational attainment in other contexts such as across genders, races, and
countries. For instance, it would be relevant to investigate changes in the returns to school-
ing in countries with dierent labor-market institutions. Institutions that compress wages
may reduce the incentives for schooling investment and perhaps, holding other institutional
aspects constant, this wage compression may explain the lower educational attainment in
some European countries compared to the United States. Similarly, it is relevant to explore
the changes in the returns to education for women in conjunction with the observed increase
in labor market participation and the reduction in the gender wage gap. A glance at the
data suggests that changes in the returns to schooling for women have been similar to that of
men. Hence, together with faster overall wage growth and an increase in labor market hours
33for women may explain the larger increase in educational attainment observed for women
between 1940 and 2000. Third, our analysis has taken the direction of technical change as
given. It would be interesting to study quantitatively the process of human capital accumu-
lation allowing for endogenous technical change in the spirit of Galor and Moav (2000). We
leave all these relevant explorations for future research.
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38Table 1: Calibration
Preferences  = 1=1:04,  = 0:72,  = 0:66
Life Expectancy Linear trend with T(1900) = 47 and T(2000) = 64
Technology  = 0:9
Productivity z0 = 1 (normalization), g = 1:012
z1;0 = 0:41, g1 = 0:996
z2;0 = 0:20, g2 = 1:001
z3;0 = 0:05, g3 = 1:027
Table 2: Decomposition
Baseline Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Exp. 5 Exp. 6
Years of schooling
1940 10.8 10.5 10.2 10.4 10.7 11.9 9.6
2000 13.4 13.0 13.0 11.9 13.2 14.7 9.7
% change 24.3 23.8 26.8 14.2 23.8 22.8 0.2
% Change in relative
earnings 2000{1940
College/HS 4.46 5.09 5.45 -2.84 3.79 9.21 -0.74
HS/Less HS 5.35 4.96 2.40 7.05 4.03 15.65 -1.26
Annual Growth of
GDP per Worker (%) 2.00 2.05 1.63 1.29 1.06 2.52 0.95
Note { In the rst experiment z1;t is kept constant at its initial level while all over exogenous variables are
growing as in the baseline experiment. In the second experiment z2;t is constant while other exogenous are
growing. In the third experiment z3;t is constant. In the fourth zt is constant. In the fth experiment T()
is constant. In the sixth experiment z1;t, z2;t and z3;t are kept constant.
39Table 3: Educational Attainment and Lifetime Income in the Baseline Model with Perfect
Foresight and in the Model with \History-Based" Expectations
Baseline n = 100 n = 1
Years of schooling
1940 10.8 9.6 9.6
2000 13.4 11.5 10.5
% change 24.3 20.6 9.3
% change in relative
lifetime income, 1940 to 2000
College/HS (actual) 10.6 10.6 10.6
College/HS (expected) 10.6 9.8 4.6
HS/Less HS (actual) 12.8 12.8 12.8
HS/Less HS (expected) 12.8 15.0 7.7
40Figure 1: Educational Attainment in the U.S., 1940{2000
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Source { IPUMS samples from the 1940{2000 Census. The education variable is \educ." We dene the
less-than-high-school level as an educational achievement between nursery school and grade 11. The high-
school-or-some-college level is from grade 12 to 3 years of college. The college level is dened as at least 4
years of college.
41Figure 2: Relative Earnings of White Men in the U.S., 1940{2000









High school / Less than high school






































Source { IPUMS samples from the 1940{2000 Census. The education variable is \educ." The earnings
variable is \incwage," that is wage and salary income for employed individuals. The education groups are
dened as in Figure 1.
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Panel b { Case where no individual chooses high-school
43Figure 4: Relative Earnings Model vs. Data








High school or some college / 
Less than high school
College / 
High school or some college
Note { The model results are represented with solid lines. The U.S. data are represented by dotted lines.
44Figure 5: Educational Attainment Model vs. Data
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Note { The model results are represented with solid lines. The U.S. data are represented by dotted lines.
45